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A b strac t
We develop a sim ple m odel th a t  endogenises th e  difference in  spillovers betw een 
horizon ta l and  vertical FD I. We find th a t  even th o u g h  horizonta l M NEs m ay tra n s ­
fer m ore advanced technology abroad , th is  does n o t im ply th a t  m ore knowledge 
spillovers occur. D espite th e  h igher p o ten tia l for knowledge spillovers, local firms 
are less likely to  absorb  th e  m ore advanced technology, while horizontal M NEs m ay 
take  stronger ac tion  to  p reven t knowledge spillovers from  occurring. T he technolog­
ical stance of th e  host cou n try  is th u s v ita l for determ in ing  w hich ty p e  of F D I yields 
th e  h ighest knowledge spillovers.
1 In troduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) a ttracts  warm attention from governments in developed 
and developing countries. A prime reason for this interest are the benefits FDI allegedly 
have for host economies. A part from direct effects on employment and income, govern­
ments expect FDI to generate im portant spillover effects, among them  technological or 
knowledge spillovers effects. From an economic perspective knowledge spillovers are a 
valid reason for government intervention. The social benefits of FDI will be larger than 
the private benefits, leading to suboptimal levels of investment. Forming such a classic 
example of market failure, the academic literature has devoted much attention to estab­
lishing knowledge spillovers, finding it hard however to distinguish knowledge spillovers 
from other sources of benefits from FDI (e.g. Smeets, 2008, Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; 
Gorg and Greenaway, 2004).
* Corresponding author: P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 24 3615888; 
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The basic case for government intervention is the same for developed and developing 
countries. The extent by which knowledge spillovers occur in either type of country will 
be different though. The reason is tha t FDI in developed countries is mainly market 
seeking, aiming to serve local markets through local sales rather than  through exports. 
By contrast, in developing countries FDI typically aims to make use of the cheap resources 
those countries offer, in order to establish efficiency gains in the production chain. While 
the latter is referred to as vertical FDI, the former is known as horizontal FDI. Both 
types of FDI have in common th a t the investing firms generally originate from developed 
countries, though recently the share of developing countries in outward FDI has increased 
(e.g. UNCTAD, 2008), while also tapping into developed countries’ local knowledge bases 
of developed countries has been mentioned as reason to engage in vertical FDI (Smeets, 
2009).
The argument in the literature is th a t horizontal FDI will yield higher knowledge 
spillovers than  vertical FDI. The reasoning is as follows. If a firm invests abroad to gain 
market access, its competitive advantage over local firms should be sufficiently high to 
compensate its ‘burden of foreignness’, th a t is: the disadvantage it has regarding knowl­
edge of local markets, consumer preferences and business practices. Accordingly, the firm 
will transfer part of its knowledge capital to the local subsidiary, giving it a competitive 
advantage, but also increasing the potential for knowledge spillovers. For vertical FDI 
this is much less the case. Seeking efficiency gains, vertical FDI only concerns transferring 
abroad those parts of the firm’s value chain leading to efficiency gains. Less knowledge 
is transferred, implying a lower potential for knowledge spillovers than  from horizontal 
FDI (Beugelsdijk et al., 2008). Moreover, the knowledge transferred will typically be less 
technologically advanced, decreasing knowledge spillover potential even more (Driffield 
and Love, 2007).
This would be bad news for developing countries, since they mostly rely on incoming 
vertical FDI. By contrast, it would make a stronger case for government intervention in 
developed countries, relying as they do on horizontal FDI. In this paper we challenge 
the view th a t horizontal FDI leads to higher spillovers than  vertical FDI. To make our 
point, we develop a simple model th a t endogenises the difference in spillovers between 
horizontal and vertical FDI, showing th a t knowledge spillovers are an intricate outcome 
of the host country’s technological stance, the absorptive capacity of local firms, and 
strategic behaviour of MNEs. We will show th a t even though horizontal MNEs may 
transfer more advanced technology abroad, this does not imply th a t more knowledge 
spillovers occur. Despite the higher potential for knowledge spillovers, local firms will 
also find it harder to absorb the more advanced technology. Moreover, in view of the 
higher potential for knowledge spillovers, horizontal MNEs may take stronger action to
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prevent knowledge spillovers from occurring. Consequently, the technological stance of 
the host country becomes vital for determining which type of FDI yields the highest 
knowledge spillovers. Likewise, host country characteristics such as intellectual property 
rights protection are im portant for establishing knowledge spillovers from FDI, as well as 
the ownership structure of the MNEs foreign venture.
The model we employ has some relation to other models in the literature on knowledge 
spillovers. Specific aspects of our model can be found in Müller and Schnitzer (2006) and 
in Smeets and de Vaal (2006). The novelty of our model is th a t we combine the relevant 
aspects for knowledge spillovers to sketch a full(er) picture of knowledge spillovers from 
FDI, and th a t we endogenise the difference between knowledge spillovers from horizontal 
and vertical FDI. Furthermore, a novelty of our framework is th a t we include strategic 
behaviour on part of the MNE in view of knowledge spillovers from FDI.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses knowledge spillovers from 
FDI and how it relates to the type of FDI involved. Section 3 presents our basic model 
for knowledge spillovers from FDI. Section 4 applies the model to analyse the differences 
in knowledge spillovers between vertical and horizontal FDI. Section 5 concludes.
2 K now ledge spillovers and typ es o f F D I
2 .1  F a c to r s  e n h a n c in g  k n o w le d g e  sp illo v e r s
In general, the possibilities for host economies to profit from knowledge spillovers from 
FDI through MNEs is related to their absorptive capacity and their level of technological 
advancedness. To increase the potential for knowledge spillovers, the technology of the 
host country should be less advanced than  th a t of the MNE. Technological backwardness 
enhances knowledge spillovers. At the same time, the host country will need a minimum of 
technology to be able to absorb the technology of the MNE. This is necessary to assimilate 
the technology into the existing technologies of local firms. The smaller the difference 
becomes, the higher this absorptive capacity will be (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Smeets, 
2009). Absorptive capacity and backwardness therefore both depend on the technology 
level of the local firm relative to the technology level of the MNE. This implies tha t, given 
a certain level of knowledge with local firms, also the level of technology employed by 
the MNE is im portant. This may vary with the type of MNE, for instance horizontal 
and vertical MNEs, as we will discuss later. Another issue is th a t the technology level of 
the MNE and of local firms will not be independent. To be able to produce in the host 
country, local workers should have sufficient skills to work with the M NE’s technology. If 
local labour skills are low, the MNE is likely to transfer a lower level of technology (Kokko
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and Blomstrom, 1995; Wang and Blomstrom, 1992).1
MNEs are seen as an im portant source of technological spillovers, primarily because 
the channels through which technologies may spill over require spatial proximity (Girma 
and Wakelin, 2007). The three main channels th a t have been identified are: dem onstra­
tion and im itation effects, labour mobility and backward and forward linkages (Castellani 
and Zanfei, 2006). In case of demonstration effects, the MNE demonstrates th a t a certain 
technology or practice is suitable in the host country, indirectly providing information 
about the costs and benefits of the new technology and the risks th a t are involved. Lo­
cal firms become aware of the possibilities and can im itate the technology, for example 
through reverse engineering or through informal contacts. This channel is only relevant 
if the MNE is present in the country, since local firms have to be able to closely observe 
the MNE. Furthermore, local firms need to know whether the particular technology is 
feasible given the conditions in the country. In case of labour mobility, employees tha t 
were trained by the MNE may move to a local firm, taking their newly acquired knowl­
edge with them. If the wages received in the new firm do not fully reflect this, a positive 
technological spillover takes place. Not only knowledge about production techniques can 
be brought in by a firm, but also managerial skills and ‘business sense’ are im portant. 
Moreover, this channel works best if the MNE is present in the country, since mobility of 
local workers across national borders is limited. In case MNE technologies spill over to 
local firms through backward and forward linkages, a distinction must be made between 
technological spillovers and technology transfer. The MNE could, for instance, trans­
fer knowledge to its suppliers to improve the quality of its inputs. Since the knowledge 
is transferred on purpose, this is not a knowledge spillover but a knowledge transfer2 
(Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Meyer, 2004). However, it would not be likely th a t the local 
firm fully compensates the MNE, since it can use the knowledge also in its interaction 
with other firms (Blomstrom et al., 1999). If the MNE is not compensated for the use 
of this knowledge in the interaction with others, a knowledge spillover has taken place. 
Technological spillovers will then be a consequence of technology transfers (Smeets, 2009). 
Also linkages are mainly local in nature, since this reduces transport costs and facilitates 
communication between the local firm and MNE.
The effectiveness of these spillover channels is influenced by several factors. Intellectual 
property rights protection is im portant for all kinds of spillover channels. If technologies 
reach the local firms but these firms are not allowed to use these technologies in their
1Yeaple (2003) indeed finds this relationship for U.S. outward foreign investments.
2It is im portant to  distinguish spillovers from transfers in its own right. To the extent th a t a local firm 
acquires technological knowledge from the MNE beyond the scope of a market transaction or without 
fully compensating the MNE, a spillover has taken place. If, by contrast, the technology flow is the result 
of the MNE licensing a particular technology to  a host firm or from transferring knowledge to  increase 
input quality of inputs, the term  technology transfer is appropriate.
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production, the spillover channels do not lead to actual spillovers. However, the existence 
of strong intellectual property rights can also alter the behaviour of MNEs, since the risk 
of technological spillovers is reduced. Spillovers through labour mobility is more likely if 
the MNE hires a large amount of local workers and if there are many local firms interested 
in the local worker after it has received a training from the MNE. More specifically, firms 
th a t are active in the same industry as the MNE will be most interested, since they 
are most likely to be able to use the technologies in a profitable way (Gorg and Strobl, 
2005). Likewise, MNEs will be more willing to establish local linkages if they benefit from 
these linkages. For example, backward linkages are positively affected by the technical 
capability of potential local suppliers (Blomstrom et al., 1999). If suppliers are able to 
offer high-quality inputs to the MNE, the MNE will be willing to source its inputs locally. 
Linkages can be crucial to access the resources th a t are present in the host country, like 
labour, suppliers, markets, et cetera. A business network helps the firm to take advantage 
of the host country’s resources. The more resources the MNE needs from the host country, 
the more local linkages it will establish. However, if the MNE is only looking for cheap 
labour and does not need other resources from the host country, it will not establish a 
large business network, so linkages would be smaller. In tha t case, the firm operates in an 
‘enclave’. (Chen et al., 2004; Lall, 1980; Smeets, 2009). This also has consequences for the 
likelihood of technological spillovers through backward and forward linkages, as well as for 
intra-industry spillovers through demonstration and imitation. If the MNE operates in 
an ‘enclave’, local firms do not have the opportunity to observe its technology. However, 
if the MNE has a large local network, spillovers through im itation and demonstration 
become more likely.
Establishing a local network can be costly though. Especially if the host country is 
very different from the home country, these costs will be high (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1997). Therefore, participating in an international joint venture could be beneficial for the 
MNE. International joint ventures can decrease the costs of establishing a local network, 
since the local partner already has a local network. If the host country is very different 
w ith respect to institutions, culture, and /o r consumer preferences, participating in a joint 
venture can lead to a substantial decrease in costs of setting up a local network. The firm 
benefits from the knowledge of the local partner. However, joint ventures also enhance 
spillovers to local firms, especially if it is not possible to write contracts th a t fully protect 
these technologies. An international joint venture may thus increase spillovers through 
the direct contact with local firms. Likewise, shared ownership will affect the effective­
ness of spillover channels. International joint ventures may establish more upstream  and 
downstream linkages because the local partner already has a local network, whereas a 
wholly owned subsidiary has to take large efforts to develop such a network. This local
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network may also lead to increased contact between the local firm and the MNE, giving 
local firms the opportunity to observe the technologies and im itate them. Furthermore, 
the local partner is often responsible for the hiring policies. Since the local partner is less 
concerned with technological spillovers, they will have less incentives to prevent workers 
from leaving. Technological spillovers through worker mobility are therefore more likely 
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008).
Technological spillovers can be costly for the MNE, giving them  an incentive to try  
to reduce them. For instance, if the MNE sells its products on local markets, techno­
logical spillovers could lower future profits because of a decreased competitive advantage 
(Blomstrom et al, 1999). To prevent this, the MNE can decide to reduce their technology 
level by transferring less sophisticated technologies to the host country. The magnitude 
of the reduction depends on the effectiveness of spillover channels. The higher the effec­
tiveness of spillover channels, the larger this reduction will be. For example, if intellectual 
property rights protection is weak, the effectiveness of spillover channels becomes high 
and the MNE will transfer less sophisticated technologies to the host country. As a re­
sult, the potential for technological spillovers decreases. Also if an MNE participates in 
an international joint venture, the effectiveness of spillovers channels increases. Again, 
the MNE will be less willing to transfer sophisticated technologies and the potential for 
technological spillover decreases. In both cases, the effectiveness of spillover channels has 
a negative effect on the potential for spillovers. However, by itself, the effectiveness of 
spillover channels has a positive effect on spillovers. Hence, the overall effect on spillovers 
of a change in the effectiveness of spillover channels is ambiguous (Smeets, 2009).
Moreover, if absorptive capacity is low, a lower technology level can lead to an in­
crease in absorptive capacity, increasing spillovers. Consequently, the MNE might decide 
to transfer more sophisticated knowledge to prevent technological spillovers, since the 
more backward the local firm is compared to the MNE, the lower absorption will be. 
The costs to the MNE of transferring less sophisticated technology will be higher the 
smaller the difference between the technology level of the MNE and the local firms, or the 
stronger market competition. In th a t case, the MNE needs its firm-specific advantages to 
compete with other firms. Not transferring its firm-specific advantages leads to a profit 
loss (Blomstrom et al., 1999, Kokko and Blomstrom, 1995).
MNEs can also try  to reduce the effectiveness of spillover channels. In the case of 
spillovers through labour mobility, such could be done by paying higher wages. If the 
wage the local firm is willing to pay to the worker is higher than  the wage the MNE 
pays, the worker has an incentive to leave the MNE. So, the MNE can reduce the risk of 
spillovers by offering a higher wage than  the local firm does. However, if the local firm 
expects to gain a lot if it hires the local worker, the local firm will offer a high wage. If the
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costs of preventing the worker to leave are higher than  the losses as a result of technological 
spillovers, the MNE will let the worker go and a technological spillover could take place 
(Fosfuri et al., 2001). MNEs can also influence the effectiveness of spillover channels by 
reducing the amount of linkages and becoming less involved in local networks. However, 
since these linkages and the local network were established to benefit from the resources 
the host country has to offer, this will be costly. Finally, to prevent spillovers, the MNE 
can choose a different ownership structure.
2 .2  H o r iz o n ta l  v e r su s  v e r t ic a l  F D I
An im portant aspect regarding knowledge spillovers from MNEs is their heterogeneity, for 
instance the distinction between horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. In the case of horizontal 
FDI, a firm wants to sell its products in a foreign country, and decides to open a subsidiary 
in this country. In the case of vertical FDI, a firm opens a subsidiary in the foreign country 
to gain efficiencies in its value added chain. Firms will choose to engage in horizontal FDI 
if the costs of transporting its products and the cost of not being physically present in the 
host country are smaller than  the loss of plant economies of scale and the extra fixed costs. 
Furthermore, the firm will not license if it wants to keep its firm specific knowledge to 
itself. Firms will choose to engage in vertical FDI if the difference in factor costs between 
the home and the host country is large enough, and the costs of outsourcing are larger 
than  the benefits of outsourcing. (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Ethier, 2000).
Since the motive and the considerations to engage in FDI differ between vertical and 
horizontal FDI, spillovers will also differ. If a horizontal MNE invests in a country, its 
revenues should be high enough to be able to incur the high costs of engaging in FDI. 
They need to have a substantial competitive advantage over local firms to acquire a large 
enough market share. Therefore, to compete successfully with local firms, which have 
more knowledge of local markets, consumer preferences and business practices, the hori­
zontal MNEs needs to transfer part of its knowledge capital to its subsidiary in the host 
country (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). This knowledge capital creates a competitive ad­
vantage for the MNE, but is also interesting for local firms in view of potential knowledge 
spillovers.3
The case of vertical FDI is somewhat different. To countries tha t are low-skilled 
labour abundant, vertical MNEs will transfer low-skilled labour intensive production, 
retaining the high-skilled labour intensive parts of production at home. In contrast to 
horizontal FDI, only the less technologically advanced parts of production will enter the
3 The fact th a t horizontal multinationals do not license their knowledge capital and brand to  a foreign 
party may serve as proof of their having valuable knowledge capital. By establishing a subsidiary, they 
prefer to  keep this knowledge capital internal, but the risk of knowledge spillovers remains.
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host country. Moreover, whereas horizontal MNEs invest in a country to exploit their 
competitive advantage, vertical MNEs invest to create a competitive advantage. As a 
result, the vertical MNE transfers less knowledge capital abroad, reducing the potential 
for knowledge spillovers.
The question arises whether or not local firms still have anything to learn from vertical 
MNEs. If they transfer only less technological advanced parts of production, they might 
be on the same technology level as local firms. In many instances, local firms may indeed 
have the same technology level as the MNE. However, there will also be a range of host 
country technology and efficiency levels for which local firms could still learn from vertical 
MNEs. W hereas the vertical MNE only produces low-skilled labour intensive products in 
the host country, it will try  to do this in the most efficient way. If they are more efficient 
than  local firms, technological spillovers can take place. Furthermore, what is considered 
as low-skilled labour intensive outward FDI for an advanced country, could be relatively 
high-skilled labour intensive FDI for a less-developed country (Lall et al., 2007).
If the technology level of local firms is much lower than  the technology level of the 
vertical MNE, the MNE is also more likely to choose to set up a plant of its own than 
to outsource production. The further the expertise of the local firm is from the product 
the MNE demands, the larger will be the investment local firms make to produce those 
inputs. If contracts are incomplete and outside options are limited, a hold up problem 
arises and local firms will underinvest to protect their bargaining power (Grossman and 
Helpman, 2003). From th a t perspective, a larger technological gap will enhance vertical 
FDI. Moreover, the benefits of outsourcing decrease when the technology gap is larger. 
The productivity advantage of outsourcing consists of better information about local 
conditions and plant-level economies of scale. A too low technology of local firms erodes 
this advantage, stimulating vertical FDI.
Vertical MNEs thus transfer less advanced knowledge than  horizontal MNEs, but for 
low levels of host country technology vertical MNEs still create a potential for technologi­
cal spillovers. This will have interesting implications if absorptive capacity and backward­
ness are taken into account. As argued, technological spillovers will only take place if the 
local firm is able to absorb the technologies of the MNE. This means th a t MNEs with the 
most advanced technologies do not always generate the largest spillovers. If local firms 
have low absorptive capacity, vertical MNEs create larger technological spillovers than 
horizontal MNEs. On the other hand, the potential for technological spillovers will be 
higher in the case of horizontal FDI. If the level of technology of local firms is close to the 
vertical MNE, there is not much potential for technological spillovers from vertical FDI. 
However, since the technology level of horizontal MNEs is higher, there is still a potential 
for technological spillovers from horizontal FDI. So, both the absorptive capacity and the
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backwardness of local firms determines whether technological spillovers from horizontal 
FDI are larger than  vertical FDI or the other way around.
Vertical and horizontal MNEs also differ with respect to the effectiveness of spillover 
channels. Vertical MNEs will create less technological spillovers through im itation and 
dem onstration and linkages. As argued, technologies only spill over through these channels 
if the MNE is embedded in the country. MNEs th a t are only looking for cheap labour, 
as in the case of vertical FDI, are less likely to establish a local network and operate in 
‘enclaves’, whereas horizontal MNEs are more embedded in the country (Chen et al., 2004; 
Lall 1980; Smeets, 2009). As a result, horizontal MNEs provide more spillover channels 
for technologies to spill over than  vertical MNEs.
However, the change in behaviour of the MNE as a result of spillovers will also differ 
between horizontal MNEs and vertical MNEs. Horizontal MNEs are more likely to make 
a genuine effort to reduce spillovers. Spillovers are especially costly if the MNE directly 
competes with local firms on the product market, which is the case for horizontal MNEs. 
The costs of reducing its technology level also differs between horizontal and vertical 
MNEs, however. A lower technology level results in a smaller competitive advantage for 
the horizontal MNE. In this case, the extent of competition and the initial technological 
distance between the MNE and the local firms is im portant. In the case of vertical FDI, a 
lower technology level means th a t the quality of part of its production process decreases. 
This can lead to a final product of lower quality, which makes it more difficult to compete 
on world markets.
3 M odelling know ledge spillovers from  FD I
The previous section has argued th a t technological distance between local firms and MNEs 
affects both knowledge spillover potential and absorptive capacity from FDI. Moreover, 
absorptive capacity and the effectiveness of spillover channels co-determine the extent by 
which a local firms can profit from potential knowledge spillovers. In turn, the effectiveness 
of spillovers is affected by ownership structure and intellectual property rights protection. 
Furthermore, we have argued th a t spillovers may lead to a loss of competitive advantage 
and future profits for the MNE, inducing the MNE to reconsider how much knowledge it 
will transfer abroad. Likewise, it has an incentive to reduce the effectiveness of spillover 
channels.
We will now translate these outcomes into a m athem atical model th a t can be used 
to asses the differences between vertical and horizontal FDI in generating knowledge 
spillovers. As explained, technological spillovers only take place if there is a potential 
for spillovers. We assume th a t the potential P  relates positively to the difference in the
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technology level of local firms (Tl) and the technology level the MNE employs in the host 
country (TM) and th a t it is nonnegative (TM > T l):
P  =  t m  — t l >  0. (1)
Actual spillovers will be smaller than  the potential spillovers as a result of limited 
absorptive capacity of local firms and the effectiveness of spillover channels. Absorptive 
capacity is related to technological distance as well. Using A to denote absorptive capacity, 
we assume:
A =  1 — b(TM _  Tl ) 0 <  b <  1. (2)
To keep the analysis tractable we assume a linear relationship and require A >  0. Con­
sequently, for local firms to absorb knowledge, technological distance should not be too 
large: T D  = Tm  — Tl < 1/b.
Regarding the spillover channels we assume th a t their effectiveness depends on several 
aspects. First, it depends on the effectiveness of the different channels involved, i.e. 
worker mobility, linkages and im itation and dem onstration effects. The effectiveness of 
these channels will be summarized by F . Second, ownership structure is im portant (O). 
Shared ownership affects the amount of spillovers reaching the local partner firm, but also 
has an indirect effect through its impact on the M NE’s local network, the importance of 
linkages and the possibilities for imitation. This indirect effect will be stronger, the less 
effective spillover channels are with full ownership. Third, we model a relationship with 
intellectual property rights protection ( I P P ). The stronger intellectual property rights, 
the less effective the spillover channels.
Using H  to denote the effectiveness of the spillover channels th a t results, we get:
H  = [ F  + (1  -  O)(1 -  F )](1  -  I P P ) , (3)
where 0 <  F  <  1 and 0 <  I P P  <  1 . Intellectual property rights protection is strong 
(weak) if I P P  is high (low). Moreover, we constrain MNE’s ownership of its venture 
abroad to be complete (O =  1) or equally shared with a local partner (O =  1/2). Conse­
quently, 0 <  H  < 1 .
Actual spillovers can be seen as the product of spillover potential, absorptive capacity 
and the effectivenes of spillover channels:
S  =  P  • A • H  =  T D  [1 -  b • TD] H, (4)
where we recall th a t T D  >  0 is the technical distance between the M NE’s technology and 
th a t of local firms. Similar to Smeets and de Vaal (2006), there is an inverted u-shaped
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relationship between technological distance and the amount of spillovers. We assume that 
local firms can only absorb new technologies if TL >  0 and therefore require S <  0 for 
Tl =  0. If Tmax is the highest level of technology the MNE could employ abroad, this 
implies:
Tmax >  1/b >  1. (Condition 1)
As a result, the inverted u-shape lies fully within the range of the model and its width 
is 1/b.4 If the MNE would not take any action to prevent knowledge spillovers to occur, 
(4) would imply S =  TDmax[1 -  b • TDmax]H, with TDmax =  Tmax -  T l .  Maximum 
spillovers are S =  H /4b at a local technology level of TL =  Tmax — 1 /2b. Before tha t 
point, absorptive capacity dominates spillover potential, and vice versa beyond spillover 
maximum.
Since spillovers are costly to the MNE, it will try  to prevent them. To th a t end, the 
MNE may reduce its technology level abroad to TM < Tmax, it may reduce the effectiveness 
of spillover channels, or both. As a result, TM and H  are endogenous and depend on a 
cost-benefit analysis on part of the MNE. Following Müller and Schnitzer (2006), we 
assume th a t spillovers have a negative effect on the M NE’s profits:5
% =  %0 — mS, (5)
where %0 represents MNE profits if there were no spillovers and where m  is the extent 
by which spillovers affect profits. The larger m, the bigger the incentive for the MNE 
to reduce spillovers, . The marginal benefit of lowering TM below Tmax is implicit in (5), 
taking into account(4):
r
—  =  - m H [1 -  2b • TD]. (6)
a l M
Reducing its technology below Tmax will not always increase MNE profits. The reason is 
th a t a lower technology level decreases the potential for knowledge spillovers, but at the 
same time enhances local firm’s absorptive capacity.6 Only if d%/dTm is negative at Tmax, 
will the MNE consider lowering its technology level abroad. From (6) it follows tha t this 
is the case if, and only if, T D max <  1/2b.
Reducing TM is also costly for the MNE, for instance because it reduces its competitive
4S =  0 if Tl = Tmax (upper bound) or Tl = Tmax — 1/b > 0 (lower bound).
5 Grünfeld (2006) represents this effect in a Cournot duopoly game in which spillovers have a negative 
effect on equilibrium levels of output.
6This is in contrast to  in Müller and Schnitzer (2006), who do not take into account absorptive 
capacity. In their model a lower technology level always leads to  less spillovers. Grünfeld (2006) takes 
absorptive capacity effects into account, but assumes th a t MNE technology is entirely different from the 
technology of local firms. Potential spillovers are then fully determined by the absolute technology level 
of the MNE, and not by technological distance.
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advantage in local or international markets. We model the profit loss (PL) th a t results 
from a lower technology level by:
P L t =  (Tmax -  Tm )2X /T D max, (7)
where X  indicates the costs of reducing TM and where we assume th a t the profit loss is 
quadratic in the reduction achieved. The term  is divided by T D max to guarantee th a t the 
MNE never reduces its technology level to the technology level of the host country. A 
sufficient condition for TM > TL is7:
X H
— > — . (Condition 2)
m  2
The optimal level of TM becomes:
„  mTmax -  bH • T l • TDmax “  H  • TDmax/2 
T m — ----------------- v------------------------------------- . (8)
M X -  bH • T D m V 7
By definition, TM is constrained to be lower or equal than  Tmax. Furthermore, if condition 
Condition 2 holds, the MNE never reduces TM to TL, which implies T D  >  0 always. 
Moreover, and importantly, the MNE will only lower TM below Tmax if 0 <  TDmax <  1/2b.8 
T hat is, beyond the level of local technology for which spillovers reach a maximum. If 
the initial technological distance between MNE and local firms is too large, the lowering 
of MNE technology will increase the local firm’s absorption capacity by more than  it 
reduces spillover potential. If T D max is zero, spillover potential is zero and the MNE 
chooses Tm =  Tmax.
The MNE can also affect spillovers by reducing the effectiveness of the spillover chan- 
nels.9 Let F0 be the effectiveness of spillover channels if the MNE does not take any 
action, while F  is the optimal effectiveness of spillover channels from the perspective of 
the MNE. Accordingly, the change in profits at F  =  F0 becomes:
d^
—  =  - m  • TD[1 -  b • TD][1 -  IP P ]O  <  0. (9)
d F
Reducing F  below F0 therefore always yields benefits to the MNE so tha t F  <  F0. 
W hether or not the MNE actually tries to reduce F  depends on the costs involved. To
7To be obtained by requiring d^/dTM — dPL/dTM  to  be positive at T m  =  TL-
8This is in contrast to  Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), who argue th a t MNEs engaging in an inter­
national joint venture will lower technology levels to  reduce spillovers.
9This is for instance modeled by Fosfuri et al. (2001) for the case of spillovers through worker mobility. 
In their model the MNE could decide to  decrease the effectiveness of this spillover channel by offering a 
higher wage. The MNE may also affect the other two spillover channels after the MNE has decided on 
the ownership structure. For simplicity, however, the ownership structure is assumed to  be exogenous.
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reduce the effectiveness of spillover channels, the MNE may have to pay higher wages, 
import inputs rather than  source locally or refrain from engaging in local networks. As 
it becomes more and more difficult to decrease the spillover channels th a t remain, we 
assume th a t these costs increase quadratically in F0 — F :
P L f  =  Z  • (Fo -  F ) 2, (10)
with Z  >  0 is a general costs parameter. Equating the marginal costs of reducing spillover 
channel effectiveness to its marginal benefits, gives:
=  m • TD[1 -  b • TD][1 -  IP P ]O  (11)
0 2Z ’ ( '
which is smaller than  F0 by condition Condition 1. A sufficient condition for optimal F  
to be positive is:
4bF0 >  O(1 -  IP P )m /2 Z . (Condition 3)
If Condition 3 holds the MNE will not eliminate all spillover channels, even when spillovers 
are at its maximum.10 Logically, this is more likely the higher the costs of reducing 
spillovers (high Z, high F0) and the lower the benefits of reducing the effectivity of spillover 
channels (low O, high I P P , low m, high b).
The extent by which the MNE desires to reduce F  also depends on the technology 
level it chooses to employ abroad. Moreover, as we have seen, its desire to reduce TM 
below Tmax depends on the initial technical distance between the MNE and local firms 
T D max. Consequently, the MNE may or may not reduce TM which has consequences 
for the level of F  chosen as well. To illustrate this we show in Figure 1 spillovers for 
four different scenario’s. The curve S(F0,Tmax) gives spillovers in case the MNE does not 
optimize and produces abroad with Tmax and F0. The curve S(F0,TM) gives spillovers if 
the MNE optimizes TM, but not F . The curve S(F,Tmax) depicts spillovers when the MNE 
optimizes F, but not TM. The curve S(F,TM), finally, gives the situation when the MNE 
optimizes both TM and F . Though all curves are drawn for the case of full ownership, 
their curvature equally applies to share ownership. A m athem atical substantiation of the 
different curves is given in the Appendix.
As noted, the MNE will only adjust its level of technology if T D max <  1 / 2b. Else 
it will choose Tm =  Tmax . This implies th a t S(F0,TM) only differs from S(F0,Tmax) if 
Tl >  Tmax — 1 / 2b, as drawn, and spillovers remain at a maximum at TL =  Tmax — 1 /2b.
10The condition is derived by evaluating (11) at the technical distance for which the marginal benefits 
of reducing F  are at a maximum. From (9) is follows th a t this is the case when T D  = 1/26, the point 
where spillovers are maximal.
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To the right of this maximum, the reduction of the technology level of the MNE is largest 
at intermediate technological distances (see Appendix). Intuitively, this can be explained 
by the fact tha t both at large and small technological distances, a reduction of technology 
only affect spillovers marginally. At large distances because of low absorptive capacity of 
local firms, at small distances because of low spillover potential.
If the MNE only reduces the effectiveness of spillover channels, spillovers decrease at 
all levels of local technology. This follows directly from (4) and (11), which for given 
Tmax and b only depends on H . The decrease will be highest, the closer local technology 
is to Tmax — 1 /2b. Curve S(F,Tmax) represents this effect. However, the reduction of 
the effectiveness of spillovers could be so large th a t the initial maximum becomes a local 
minimum. W hereas a deviation of TL from Tmax — 1 /2b by itself decreases spillovers, it 
also lower the reduction of F . If the latter effect is strong, the curve may become ’twin 
peaked’. A formal condition settling th a t this will not occur is:
4bF0 >  O(1 — IP P )m /Z . (Condition 4)
The condition resembles Condition 3, but is clearly stronger. The right-hand-side is the 
benefit-cost ratio of reducing the effectiveness of spillover channels. If this ratio relatively 
high, the reduction of the effectiveness of spillover channels is large, potentially leading 
to “twin peaks” . W hether or not this is the case depends on the shape of the original 
spillover curve, which is for a large part determined by b and F0.
Finally, when the MNE optimizes both  TM and F , curve S(F, Tm) arises. As long 
as Tl <  Tmax — 1 /2b, this curve is the same as S(F, T m ax), since then TM =  Tmax. At 
larger values of TL the MNE starts reducing its technology level, which has a negative 
effect on spillovers. As a result, F  becomes higher for each value of TL, compared to the 
case in which the MNE did not change its technology level. This has a positive effect on 
spillovers. However, this positive effect is weaker than  the negative effect of the reduction 
of Tm . As a result S(F, Tm) lies below S(F, Tmax) for TL >  Tmax — 1 /2b, see Appendix.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
4 V ertical and horizontal F D I
In Section 2 we have highlighted the main differences between horizontal FDI and vertical 
FDI in relation to knowledge spillovers. The main differences tha t were identified related 
to the technology level each type of FDI would use abroad, the effectivity of spillover 
channels and the costs and benefits of reducing spillovers. In this section, we will adapt 
our model to take these differences into account.
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As argued, an im portant difference between horizontal and vertical FDI is th a t Tmax, 
is smaller for vertical FDI than  for horizontal FDI, see also Smeets (2009), Beugelsdijk 
et al. (2008) and Driffield and Love (2007). Using superscripts V and H  to distinguish 
between vertical and horizontal FDI, we assume:
TI x  =  nTmax 0 <  n  1  (12)
As before, both  curves are inverted u-shapes, with lower and upper bounds at, respectively, 
Tk =  Tnax — 1/b >  0 and TL =  Tkax (k =  H, V ). Both the lower and the upper bound are 
therefore higher for horizontal FDI than  for vertical FDI. The width of the shapes is the 
same for both types of FDI, equalling 1/b. To have a range of values for TL for which both 
horizontal FDI and vertical FDI yields positive spillovers, we require >  T Hax — 1/b. 
Hence,
(1 -  n)Tmax <  1/b. (Condition 5)
To make the analysis consistent with zero spillovers at TL =  0 (Condition 1), this implies 
1/2 <  n  <  1.
Also the effectiveness of spillover channels differs between horizontal and vertical FDI. 
Horizontal MNEs create more linkages and have a larger local network, affecting the value 
of F0. Also m, the profit loss due to spillovers, will differ. Since horizontal MNEs compete 
directly with local firms, whereas competition for vertical MNEs is only indirect through 
factor markets, spillovers are more costly for horizontal MNEs. Hence,
F0V <  F0H and m V <  m H. (13)
Finally, the costs of reducing spillovers by decreasing its technology level will be dif­
ferent for horizontal MNEs than  for vertical MNEs. A lower technology level reduces 
the quality of the MNE product and /or increases the costs to produce this product. As 
a result, it becomes harder to compete with other firms. Since it is likely th a t firms in 
the MNE’s home country are more competitive than  firms in the host country, the costs 
of reducing its technology level are higher for vertical MNEs than  for horizontal MNEs: 
X V > X H. This reinforces the effect of the difference in m, since it is the ratio of cost 
and benefits tha t determines the optimal technology level in equation (8). Hence,
XV XH
—V > —H . (14)m  m
Clearly, these differences between horizontal and vertical FDI imply differences in 
spillovers. Ignoring for now the M NE’s reaction on the threat of spillovers, we depict in 
Figure 2 to ta l spillovers from horizontal FDI and vertical FDI in the case of full ownership.
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It shows th a t for low technology levels of local firms spillovers from vertical FDI are 
largest, and tha t for high technology levels of local firms spillovers from horizontal FDI 
are largest. These results are in contrast with the earlier literature, which sees spillovers 
from horizontal FDI larger due to a higher potential for spillovers. Figure 2 shows this is 
not the case when taking into account absorptive capacity as well.
R e su lt 1: If horizontal FDI entails the use of a higher technology level abroad 
than  vertical FDI, ceteris paribus implying a higher potential for knowledge 
spillovers from horizontal FDI, taking into account the absorptive capacity 
of host countries implies th a t the actual difference in knowledge spillovers 
between both  types of FDI depends on the host country’s technology level TL. 
Vertical FDI leads to more spillovers than  horizontal FDI when TL is low and 
vice versa when TLis high.
A sufficient condition for vertical FDI to yield higher spillovers than  horizontal FDI is 
Tl <  THax — 1/b for then absorptive capacity is zero for horizontal FDI. A sufficient 
condition for horizontal FDI to yield higher spillovers is TL > T ^ v  for then spillover 
potential is zero for vertical FDI. The level of TL for which both  curves intersect, TL, is 
implicit in:
(THax -  Tl ) H H  [1 -  b • (nTHax -  Tl )]
(nTHax -  Tl ) H v [1 -  b • (THax -  Tl )] .
Evaluating the to ta l differential of this equation at the point of intersection shows tha t 
Tl increases when H V goes up or H H goes down. If the relative effectivity of the vertical 
spillover channels increase, TL must increase to bring spillover levels closer to the maxi­
mum for horizontal spillovers. TL also increases when b goes up. A higher b increases the 
burden of being further away from the MNEs technology level, which reduces spillovers 
more when absorptive capacity dominates spillover potential, th a t is to the left of the 
maximum of the curve. Consequently, spillovers reduce more for horizontal FDI, imply­
ing Tl must increase. Similarly, a higher n  implies th a t TL must increase. The effect of a 
higher T ^ v , finally, is ambiguous because it affects both curves similarly.
Figure 2 also reflects the fact th a t spillover channels are less effective in case of vertical 
FDI. The maximum amount of spillovers is lower than  for horizontal FDI, since a smaller 
percentage of the potential for spillovers does reach local firms: S H =  H H/4b >  H V/4b =  
S V. Shared ownership increases the effectiveness of spillover channels for both  horizontal 
FDI and vertical FDI, increasing spillovers proportionally for both types of FDI for all 
levels of Tl .
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
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Figure 2 does not include the M NE’s reaction on spillovers. Since the profit loss due 
to spillovers is highest for horizontal FDI, m H >  m V, horizontal MNEs will try  harder 
to reduce the effectiveness of spillover channels than  vertical MNEs. This implies tha t 
even though the initial effectiveness of spillover channels is higher for horizontal FDI, 
its reaction may imply a lower effectiveness than  for vertical FDI. Especially around 
Tl =  Tmax — 1 / 2b this is a genuine possibility.
R e su lt 2: Horizontal MNEs will lower the effectivity of spillovers channels 
by more than  vertical MNEs. As a result, the relative effectivity of spillover 
channels of horizontal and vertical FDI becomes unclear when the reaction of 
MNEs to reduce spillover channel effectivity is taken into account.
Furthermore, the horizontal MNE reduces its technology level to a much larger extent 
than  the vertical MNE. The profit loss due to spillovers is higher, while we have also 
argued th a t the reduction of technology is less costly for horizontal MNEs. As before, 
the horizontal MNE only changes its technology level if THax — 1 /2b <  TL. Consequently, 
the technology level horizontal MNEs employ abroad may be lower than  for vertical FDI:
TMH TF . Result 1 showed th a t absorptive capacity m attered for the relative technology 
level of horizontal and vertical MNEs, now we see th a t also the difference in reaction is 
im portant.
R e su lt 3: W hen MNEs react to spillovers by lowering their technology levels 
abroad, this reaction will be stronger for horizontal MNEs than  for vertical 
MNEs. Therefore, if — 1 /2b <  TL, T ^  might be lower than  TV , even 
though the maximum technology level is higher for horizontal FDI than  for 
vertical FDI.
In summary, the shapes of the spillover curves differ between horizontal FDI and 
vertical FDI for two reasons. First, as a result of differences in the initial effectiveness of 
spillover channels. Second, as a result of the extent by which MNEs react on spillovers. 
However, whether spillovers are positive or zero depends on the level of TL. For either 
type of FDI, it holds th a t if the host country’s technology level lies between T^ax — 1/b 
and T^ax (k =  H, V ), technological spillovers will be positive. Moreover, TL determines 
for a large part which type of FDI yields highest spillovers. Likewise, the effect of local 
changes in technology on knowledge spillovers depends on the initial value of TL and the 
type of FDI.
This has im portant implications for governments desiring to a ttrac t FDI to benefit 
from knowledge spillovers. W hen the host economy’s technology level is low, governments 
might want to a ttract vertical FDI rather than  horizontal FDI, while for high values
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of local technology governments could better target at horizontal FDI. At intermediate 
technology levels, both types of FDI lead to positive spillovers, making the right policy 
choice less clear.
Should governments be able to a ttract the right type of FDI, our analysis makes clear 
th a t providing stimuli to elevate local technology levels may not be a wrong strategy to 
enhance knowledge spillovers. The amount of spillovers is not necessarily positively cor­
related with the local technology level — depending on the absorptive-capacity-spillover- 
potential trade off — while it also depends on the type of FDI one gets on board. At 
low levels of TL, for instance, it might be just as efficient to focus on measures attracting 
vertical FDI to increase local technology levels. Moreover, these spillovers might be just 
as high as the maximum possible spillovers one could reach from horizontal FDI at high 
levels of local technology.
At some point, the technology level of the host country might become high enough to 
be able to benefit from horizontal FDI. In tha t case, a relatively low technology level is 
advantageous since the MNE will take less effort to reduce these spillovers. This effect is 
strongest when intellectual property rights protection is weak, when the costs of spillovers 
are high for the MNE and when MNE has full ownership. In tha t case, Condition 4 may 
not hold and the spillover curve will be as drawn in Figure 3. This complicates the right 
policy choice. Again, a higher technology level does not automatically lead to higher 
spillovers. The MNE sees a higher technology level as a threat, and will therefore reduce 
the effectiveness of spillover channels or its technology level. Therefore, at an intermediate 
technology level spillovers are lower than  at a relatively low technology level. However, at a 
smaller technological distance, spillovers increase again. Since the potential for spillovers 
has decreased, the risk of spillovers is lower, so the MNE is less willing to reduce the 
effectiveness of spillovers channels. Hence, if the technology level of the host country is 
such th a t spillovers are at the local minimum, both an increase and a decrease of local 
technology levels may increase spillovers.
(Insert Figure 3 about here)
Not only TL affects the extent of spillovers, other host country characteristics are also 
im portant. First, the extent of competition in local markets is im portant for spillovers. 
If local competition increases, it becomes more costly to reduce TM and X  increases. 
However, only in the case of horizontal FDI will this be the case. As argued by Blomstrom 
et al. (1999), the horizontal MNE needs a higher technology level to remain competitive. 
Consequently, when competition in local markets tighten, horizontal MNEs will increase 
the level of technology employed abroad, leading to an increase in spillovers.11 However,
11From the Appendix we obtain th a t d S / d X  = (0-205 +  0 3 )aio/D.  For T D max <  1/2b, 010  >  0 and
18
th is  will only be th e  case when — TL <  1/26, since only then  th e  M NE desires to  
reduce its technology level.
R e s u l t  4: If th e  technological distance between local firms and horizontal 
M NEs is not too large, increased com petition in local m arkets will increase 
knowledge spillovers from horizontal FDI.
Also th e  extent of ow nership m atte rs  for spillovers. By itself, shared ownership in­
creases th e  ex ten t of spillovers, as it increases th e  effectiveness of spillover channels, see
(3). Moreover, it becomes harder to  reduce th e  effectiveness of spillover channels, since 
th e  local p a rtn e r has a local network which leads to  more spillover channels, see (11). For 
b o th  types of FDI, F  will therefore increase when ow nership is shared .12 The M NE could 
therefore also try  to  reduce its technology level. This is only possible if Tmax — TL <  1/26, 
while th e  effect will be stronger for horizontal FD I th an  for vertical FD I (Result 3). Since 
th e  effectiveness of spillover channels increases bu t th e  technology level of th e  M NE de­
creases for each level of TL, th e  overall effect of shared ownership on spillovers is am biguous 
in case Tmax -  Tl <  1/26.13.
R e s u l t  5: If Tmax — TL >  1/26, knowledge spillovers are higher in th e  case 
of shared ownership th a n  in th e  case of full ownership, since th e  M NE does 
not change TM. If, however, Tmax — TL <  1/26, ownership s truc tu re  has an 
am biguous effect on knowledge spillovers. Since th e  change in T  will be larger 
for horizontal FD I th a n  for vertical FD I (Result 3), th e  likelihood th a t shared 
ownership increases spillovers is larger for vertical FD I th a n  for horizontal 
FDI.
T he policy im plication of th is result is th a t if a country  w ants to  encourage in ternational 
jo in t ventures, it should take into account th e  type of FD I it is dealing w ith. In  th e  case 
of vertical FD I, th e  effect will m ostly be positive, since th e  reduction in T  will be small. 
In  th e  case of horizontal FD I th e  effect could be sm aller or even negative, since th e  M NE 
has strong incentives to  reduce its technology level.
A country m ay also decide to  streng then  its intellectual p roperty  rights protection. 
This would reduce th e  effectiveness of spillover channels per se, see (3), bu t is also lowers 
th e  incentive for M NEs to  reduce th e  effectiveness of spillover channels subdues. The
since we assume D > 0, it follows that dS /dX  > 0 if 0 2 0 5  > —0 3 , which will be the case if Condition 4 
holds.
12 Since m H > m V , the indirect effect through F  is bigger for horizontal FDI than for vertical FDI. 
From (11) it follows that dF/dO < 0 and d(dF/dO)/dm < 0. The direct effect of O on H  is however 
indeterminate by Result 2.
13 Smeets and de Vaal (2006) find that spillovers are always higher in the case of shared ownership than 
in the case of full ownership. They however do not take into account the effects of a reduction of Tm  .
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overall effect on th e  effectiveness of spillover channels is am biguous. The direct effect 
is negative, bu t th e  indirect effect on H  through F  is positive. Moreover, th e  indirect 
effect is stronger for horizontal FD I th a n  for vertical FDI, as th e  increase in F  will be 
bigger for horizontal F D I.14 Through th e  effectivity of spillover channels, a strengthening 
of intellectual p roperty  rights protection is thus more likely to  affect spillovers negatively 
for vertical FDI. As before, th e  M NE will also increase its technology level, provided 
Tmax — Tl <  1/26, which effect will be strongest in th e  case of horizontal FD I (result 
3). The overall effect of a strengthening of intellectual p roperty  rights therefore becomes 
ambiguous.
R e s u l t  6: If Tmax — TL >  1/26, technological spillovers decrease if intellec­
tu a l p roperty  rights protection increases, since th e  M NE does not change T  . 
However, if Tmax — TL <  1/26, th e  M NE changes TM, so th e  effect of a s treng th ­
ening of intellectual p roperty  rights protection is ambiguous. T he change of 
Tm  will be larger for horizontal FD I th a n  for vertical FDI.
5 C onclusion
This paper has analyzed th e  difference in knowledge spillovers between horizontal and 
vertical FDI. The difference in such spillovers is driven by im portan t differences between 
horizontal and  vertical FDI. H orizontal M NEs have a higher technology level and a higher 
effectiveness of spillover channels th a n  vertical MNEs. However, horizontal M NEs have a 
larger incentive to  reduce the ir technology level and th e  effectiveness of spillover channels.
T he little  available litera tu re  suggests th a t horizontal FD I would lead to  more spillover 
th a n  vertical FD I, bu t as th is paper has shown, th is is not necessarily th e  case. By 
incorporating host country  characteristics, absorptive capacity and strateg ic behaviour 
by th e  MNE, a more com plicated p ic tu re  of differences in spillovers from horizontal and 
vertical FD I emerges. T he most im portan t result is th a t th e  technology level of th e  host 
country for a large p a rt determ ines w hether horizontal or vertical FD I leads to  th e  highest 
spillovers. Countries w ith a low technology level are not able to  absorb th e  advanced 
technologies of horizontal MNEs, bu t are able to  benefit from technological spillovers from 
vertical MNEs. This is good news for countries w ith a low technology level. Moreover, 
since vertical FD I is often m eant to  exploit low skilled labour in less developed countries, 
while horizontal FD I m ainly ta rge ts  a t developed countries, it is likely th a t countries will 
typically a ttra c t th e  type of FD I th a t is most beneficial given the ir level of development. 
Furtherm ore, a lower technology level does not m ean th a t spillovers are au tom atically
14Since m H > m V and from (11) d F / d I P P  > 0 and d(d F /d IP P )/d m  > 0.
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lower, so th e  benefits from FD I m ight be ju s t as high in developing countries as in more 
developed countries.
A nother result of our paper is th a t if countries w ant to  affect th e  ex ten t of spillovers, 
it has to  take th e  type of FD I it is dealing w ith into account, as well as its own technology 
level. In  th e  case of horizontal FD I there is more room  for policy, since th e  country 
can give an incentive to  th e  M NE to  increase its technology level or th e  effectiveness of 
spillover channels. In  th e  case of vertical FDI, th is  effect will be weaker. However, M NEs 
do not always change the ir technology level and  th is also depends on th e  host coun try’s 
technology level. If a lower technology level has a larger effect on absorptive capacity  th an  
on th e  po ten tia l for spillovers, th e  M NE will realize th a t reducing its technology level 
leads to  higher spillovers. In  th a t case, it can only reduce spillovers by decreasing the  
effectiveness of spillover channels. This decrease in th e  effectiveness of spillover channels 
will be highest a t in term ediate levels of absorptive capacity and spillover potential. Local 
firms can use a large p a rt of th e  knowledge they  receive, so th e  benefits of reducing the  
effectiveness of spillover channels are highest for th e  MNE. These benefits could even be 
so high, th a t there emerges a local m inim um  at th is  point.
T he paper also leads to  several testab le  hypotheses. Does vertical FD I indeed lead to  
more spillovers th a n  horizontal FD I if th e  technology level of th e  host country  is large? 
Do MNEs indeed takes absorptive capacity  of local firms into account when deciding 
on th e  technology level it will employ abroad? W ill M NEs indeed try  to  influence the  
effectiveness of spillovers channels? If th a t is th e  case, th e  technology level of th e  M NE 
should be higher a t large technological distances th a n  a t small technological distances. 
Moreover, th e  effectiveness of spillover channels should be lowest a t in term ediate levels of 
technological distance.
We also see possibilities to  extend th e  model. It has been assum ed th a t th e  only 
possibility for th e  M NE to  reduce spillovers is by lowering its technology level or th e  ef­
fectiveness of spillover channels. However, th e  M NE m ight also decide to  export instead of 
engaging in FD I to  decrease spillovers. Including th is decision might be a useful extension 
of th e  model. Furtherm ore, it should be noted th a t it has been assum ed th a t different 
technologies are substitu tes, th a t is, one technology is b e tte r  th a n  th e  other. However, it 
m ight also be th e  case th a t th e  different technologies are com plem ents, so one technology 
is not necessarily b e tte r  th an  th e  other. In  th e  case of FD I from developed to  developing 
countries, technologies will be m ost likely substitu tes, b u t in th e  case of FD I between 
equally developed countries, technologies m ight be com plements. A lthough th e  m odel 
predicts th a t spillovers are small in th a t case, th is result could change if technologies 
com plem ent each other.
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A  M athem atical derivations
To analyse th e  m odel when bo th  TM and F  are endogenous, we to ta lly  differentiate 
equations (4), (3) and  (8) w ith respect to  S , H  and  TM and some relevant exogenous 
variables, to  obtain:
dTL
1 —a2 —a3 dS ai 0 0 0
d I P P
0 1 —a5 dH — a 4 a 6 a7 0
dO
0 — a g 1 dTM a 8 0 0 a i0
dX
where
a 1 =  [2bTD -  1]H a 2 =  T D (1  -  bTD) =  S /H
a 3 =  [1 -  2bTD ]H  a 4 =  - a 5 =  m(1 -  2bTD )O 2(1 -  I P P ) 2/2 Z
a 6 =  (O -  1) -  O F  +  m TD [1 -  bTD ]O 2(1 -  I P P ) / 2 Z  
a 7 =  (F  -  1)(1 -  I P P )  -  m TD [1 -  bTD]O(1 -  I P P ) 2/2 Z  
_  -b H X (2 T D max -  1 /26)/(m T D m ax) +  (bH )2
a« — ----------------------------------------------- k----------------
[X/(mTDmax) -  bH]2
bX(TDmax -  1/2b)/(m TDm ax) _  -bH (T D m ax -  1 / 2b)/ (mTDmax)
ag — ------------------------------------- n------  ain — -------------------------------------- -^-------
[X/(mTDmax) -  bH]2 [X/(mTDmax) -  bH]2
and where TDmax =  Tmax -  Tl >  T D  =  Tm  -  Tl >  0.
Taking th e  inverse yields
dS
1
— D
1 — a5ag a2 +  a3ag
d H 0 1
dTM 0 a g
dTL
a i 0 0 0
0
d I P P
a4 a6 a7
dO
a8 0 0 a i0
dX
a 5
1
w ith  D  — 1 — a 5ag. Though we cannot establish th is analytically, we will assum e the  
determ inant is positive, thus a 5ag <  1. N um erical calculations have shown th a t th is is 
not a stric t assum ption.
T he curvatures in F igure 1 follow from evaluating: dS /d T L — a! +  [a4(a2+ a 3ag) + a 8(a2a5 +  
a3)]/D :
•  T he curvature S(Fo,Tmax) follows by setting  a5-aio equal to  zero, am ounting to  
dS /d T L — a 1 ?  0, which is equivalent to  TL 7  Tmax — 1 /2b as drawn.
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•  T he curve S (F ,T max) depicts spillovers when th e  M NE optim izes F, b u t not TM. 
By setting  a 8-a 10 zero, it follows th a t dS /d T L — a 1 +  a 2a4 ?  0. Since a 4 >  0 and 
a2 ?  0 Tl ?  Tmax — 1 /2 #  it follows th a t th e  absolute slope of S (F ,T max) <  the  
absolute slope of S(F0,Tmax), as drawn. Moreover, S (F ,T max) lies below S(F0,Tmax) 
since F  <  F0 and  @H/@F >  0.
•  T he curve S(F0,TM) gives spillovers if th e  M NE optim izes TM, bu t not F . By 
setting  a4-a7 zero, it follows th a t dS /d T L — a 1(1 — a8) ?  0, using a3 — —a 1. The 
te rm  1 — a8 >  0 by condition 2, im plying dS /d T L <  0, since he M NE reduces its 
technology level only if T D max <  1 / 2b, see equation (6).
T he downward change in S  depends on th e  change in TM, which varies w ith  TL:
@Tm  — —bHX(2TDmax -  1/2b)/(m TD m ax) +  (bH )2 
@TL [X/(mTDmax) -  bH]2 '
By Condition 2 th is is negative if T D max — 1 / 2b and  positive if T D max — 0. Con­
sequently, @Tm /@Tl will be zero for some TL in between. Since from (4) we know 
th a t for T D max <  1 /2b, @S/@TM — -@S/@TL — (1 -  2bT D )H  >  0, dS /dT L is most 
negative a t T D max — 1 / 2b and least negative a t T D max — 0 as draw n in Figure 1.
•  T he curve S (F ,T M), finally, gives th e  situa tion  when th e  M NE optim izes bo th  TM 
and F . Evaluating dST/d T L for T D max <  1 / 2b, for else th e  M NE would not change 
Tm , we note th a t th e  sign of th e  determ inant is positive if a5a g <  1'T hough we 
cannot establish th is analytically, we will assum e th e  determ inant is positive. N u­
merical calculations have shown th a t th is is not a stric t assum ption Using a 1 — — a3 
and  a 4 — — a5, noting th a t (a8 — 1) <  0 by Condition 2, we obtain:
dS
—— <  0 if a2a5 >  a1' 
dTL
For T D max <  1 / 2b, th is condition becomes, noting th a t 2bTD — 1 <  0: T D (1  — 
b T D )mO (^^ zIPP  ^ <  H , which holds if Condition 4 holds.
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Figure 1: T echnologica l sp illovers from  FDI.
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Figure 2: Knowledge spillovers from horizontal and vertical FDI.
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Figure 3: Twin peaks.
